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Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Semi-presidentialism: 
Bringing Parties Back In 
 
The resurgence of interest in the effects of different regime types began with Juan 
Linz’s critique of presidentialism in the early 1990s.1 Coming both at a time when 
many countries were democratizing and adopting new constitutions as well as 
being firmly rooted in the ‘new institutionalist’ academic framework, the work of 
Linz and others was highly influential. Two decades on, the study of regime 
types remains in vogue, with José Cheibub recently devoting a whole book to a 
test of Linz’s central proposition.2 Over time, though, the terms of the debate 
have changed. The focus on presidentialism and parliamentarism has been 
complemented by an interest in semi-presidentialism.3 The study of institutional 
variation has been extended beyond its effects on the collapse or survival of new 
democracies to incorporate a much broader range of concerns, including general 
indicators of political and economic development4 as well as the initiation of 
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conflict.5 In addition, the use of different analytical methods, such as the veto-
players approach6 and principal-agent analysis,7 has produced a new generation 
of regime-type studies.8 
 This article focuses on the recent book by David Samuels and Matthew 
Shugart.9 The authors state that the “intellectual impact” of Juan Linz is felt 
throughout the book10 and they make it clear that their approach is rooted in a 
“theory of how institutions shape politicians’ behavior”.11 Thus, they place 
themselves resolutely within the institutionalist tradition, even if that tradition 
can no longer be labelled ‘new’, and they focus on the effects of variation in the 
separation of powers, comparing the impact of presidentialism, parliamentarism 
and two forms of semi-presidentialism – president-parliamentarism and 
premier-presidentialism. At the same time, though, apart from a brief discussion 
towards the end of the volume, they are not concerned with the impact of 
institutions on the collapse or survival of new democracies. Instead, the “central 
question” of the book is to what extent does “the presence of constitutionally 
separate executive authority ‘presidentialize’ political parties?”12 Using the 
language of the principal-agent approach, their answer is ‘considerably’ and 
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various ways in which party organisation and behaviour are shaped by regime 
type are identified throughout the course of the volume. Thus, unlike Cheibub’s 
recent volume, Samuels and Shugart’s work is part of what has been identified as 
the ‘third wave’ of regime-type studies.13 
 The Samuels and Shugart book is an important contribution to 
comparative politics and contemporary institutional analysis, bringing together 
two previously separate literatures, one on the effect of regime types and the 
other on the determinants of party organisation and behaviour. There are three 
parts to this article. The first part outlines the book’s argument and the authors’ 
main findings. The second part identifies a small number of minor issues. The 
final part extends the implications of the book, demonstrating the agenda-setting 
potential of the theoretical framework. 
 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND PARTY ORGANISATION AND 
BEHAVIOUR 
 
The focus of this volume is very clear. The authors wish to explain variation in 
the organisation and behaviour of political parties. “At the core of this book”, 
they state, “is the question of how political parties organize and when they must 
bridge the gap between the executive and the legislature”.14 Samuels and Shugart 
locate the book in a line of scholarship that dates back to the work of Maurice 
Duverger in the 1950s.15 That said, while the authors cite the main contributions 
to the study of party organisation since this time, including Kirchheimer and 
more recently Katz and Mair, they do not provide a critique of this literature. 
They acknowledge their debt to the work of Leon Epstein, but the authors merely 
assert, quite rightly, that much of the literature on party organisation has simply 
failed to take account of the impact of regime type.16 It is the “missing variable”.17 
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In this regard, they make a very strong claim. They state: “We do not claim that 
our argument supersedes or supplants the importance of social, economic, or 
cultural forces that drive party formation, evolution, and behavior … but 
analysis of these differences should begin with the difference in constitutional 
design”.18 Thus, Samuels and Shugart are interested in explaining variation in 
party organisation and they believe that the design of executive-legislative 
relations is primary in accounting for such variation. 
 This belief is based on an equally strong theoretical claim. They state: “to 
the extent that the constitutional structure separates executive and legislative origin 
and/or survival, parties will tend to be presidentialized” (emphasis in the original).19 
Separate origin refers to the situation where there is a direct presidential election 
that is held separately from legislative elections, albeit perhaps simultaneously. 
Separate survival “means that a party or legislative majority cannot remove a 
sitting president”.20 A presidentialised party has a leader with considerable 
independence in the electoral and governing arenas.21 In other words, the leader 
will stand for election on a personal platform rather than the party platform and, 
once elected, will choose cabinet members and propose policy reforms with 
minimal party intervention. By contrast, a parliamentarised party fuses the 
electoral and governing arenas. The party selects a leader who sticks to the party 
platform at the election and the party can hold the leader accountable for their 
actions following the election. Samuels and Shugart make it clear that parties in 
presidential regimes can exhibit “parliamentarized” characteristics and vice 
versa.22 However, they assert that such characteristics are likely to be 
“ephemeral” because of the “inescapable logic” of the regime’s institutional 
foundations.23 
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 The causal mechanism underpinning this theoretical claim is highly 
intuitive. Under presidentialism where executive and legislative origins are 
separate, parties face competing incentives. What it takes for the president to be 
elected is not necessarily what it takes for individual party candidates of the 
legislature to be elected or for the party as a whole to gain a majority there. 
Presidential candidates are likely to adopt a vote-seeking strategy that 
emphasises public goods because they need to win a large proportion of the 
national electorate.24 By contrast, the party’s legislative candidates may adopt a 
policy-seeking strategy that emphasises constituency goods. These competing 
incentives create a dilemma for parties under presidentialism that is absent 
under parliamentarism. This dilemma is internal to each party in the system. A 
similar dilemma occurs under presidentialism where the survival of the 
executive and the legislature is also separate. Here, presidents “have little to fear 
from their own colleagues”.25 Thus, Samuels and Shugart state: “to the extent that 
capture of a separately elected presidency is important for control over the distribution of 
the spoils of office and/or the policy process, party behavior and organization will tend to 
mimic constitutional structure, giving rise to ‘presidentialized’ parties” (emphasis in 
the original).26 By contrast, under parliamentarism parties may dismiss their own 
leaders, meaning that potentially leaders have much to fear from their own 
colleagues, but ensuring that the equivalent intra-party dilemma is essentially 
absent. 
 The theoretical framework and the causal mechanism are framed in the 
language of principal-agent analysis. In this analysis, the principal is the party 
and the agent is the party’s leader. For Samuels and Shugart, the separate origin 
of the executive and the legislature means that systems “with direct presidential 
elections exacerbate the problem of adverse selection”.27 In other words, the 
presidential candidate who is likely to be the most faithful agent of the party 
may not necessarily be the candidate who is best placed to win the election, thus 
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generating the intra-party dilemma. Equally, the separate survival of the 
executive and the legislature creates a problem of moral hazard. They state: “For 
political parties-as-principals, the danger is that leaders-as-agents might use their 
authority to advance their own personal goals rather than work toward their 
party’s collective goals”.28 Thus, while there is always the potential for conflict 
between principals and agents, the likelihood of intraparty conflict is increased 
under certain types of executive-legislative relations. 
 A real strength of Samuels and Shugart’s approach is that it allows the 
comparison of presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes. To 
date, most attention has focused on the first two systems. By emphasising the 
dynamics caused by separate origin and separate survival, semi-presidential 
countries can be integrated into the analysis as well. Consistent with the 
standard wisdom now, semi-presidentialism is defined as the situation where 
there is a directly elected president and a prime minister and cabinet that can be 
dismissed by the legislature. This is a post-Duvergerian definition of semi-
presidentialism, meaning that it does not require a country’s president to have a 
certain amount of power – however such power might be measured – in order 
for that country to be classed as semi-presidential. The definition is purely 
constitutional. In addition, Samuels and Shugart make the now equally standard 
distinction between premier-presidential and president-parliamentary forms of 
semi-presidentialism. In the former, the prime minister and cabinet can be 
dismissed solely by the legislature. In the latter, they can be dismissed by the 
president as well. 
 Samuels and Shugart assert that the problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard are likely to be greater under presidentialism and both types of 
semi-presidentialism than under parliamentarism. However, they also assert that 
“party presidentialization is greater in president-parliamentary systems than in 
premier-presidential systems”.29 The direct election of the president, they say, 
“tends to ‘contaminate’ the parties, interfering in the principal-agent relationship 
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between parties and their prime-ministerial agents in the legislature”.30 All the 
same, premier-presidentialism has the potential advantage that it can 
parliamentarise parties during periods of cohabitation – defined, again in the 
now standard way, as the situation where the president’s party is not 
represented in the cabinet. Thus, Samuels and Shugart expect there to be 
different outcomes under president-parliamentary and premier-presidential 
forms of semi-presidentialism. 
 Having established their theoretical framework and the expectations that 
flow from it, the authors proceed to a series of empirical tests. They apply their 
arguments to democratic countries. To identify the set of democracies, they rely 
on the Polity IV scale, including in their dataset all countries that have had a 
polity2 score of +5 or more for at least five consecutive years from 1945-2007. 
Using this sample, they engage in a nice mix of quantitative analysis and 
qualitative case studies. Interestingly, the quantitative analysis usually takes the 
form of simple inferential statistics. This is not a book that relies on results from 
the latest econometric model. There is also a nice mix of qualitative analysis. 
Throughout the book, there are indicative one-page vignettes illustrating 
particular points. There are also two in-depth case studies of parties’ 
‘presidential dilemmas’ in Brazil and Mexico. There is also a chapter that 
illustrates the effect of constitutional change on intraparty development. This 
chapter takes the form of two in-depth studies of France and Israel, both of 
which countries changed their organisation of executive-legislative relations and 
subsequently experienced different intra-party behaviour. Thus, this chapter 
describes the effect of a natural-like experiment. 
To demonstrate the empirical validity of their argument, Samuels and 
Shugart show that political outsiders are least likely to hold office under 
parliamentary systems and most likely to do so under presidentialism. They also 
show that outsiders are more likely under presidentialism than president-
parliamentarism and, in turn, more likely under president-parliamentarism than 
premier-presidentialism. In another test, they show that in pure parliamentary 
systems “about three in ten changes in prime minister result from purely 
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intraparty politics” (emphasis in the original).31 A similar finding occurs under 
semi-presidentialism, but here presidents also have influence over prime 
ministerial appointments and dismissal, again indicating the presidential 
‘contamination’ of intra-party relations under this system. By contrast, under 
presidentialism parties have almost no direct influence over the removal of 
presidents. In addition, they establish that there is an electoral separation of 
purpose – meaning the extent to which “parties’ candidates for executive and 
legislative office derive support from and respond to different sets of voters”32 – 
under both presidentialism and semi-presidentialism, whereas, by definition, 
this cannot be the case under parliamentarism. Finally, they show that regime 
type interacted with party system variables affect the likelihood of policy 
switching, with greater switching, or more violations of mandate representation, 
“as we move away from the ideal-typical parliamentary chain of delegation” (emphasis 
in the original).33 Along with subsidiary findings – for example, that the incidence 
of cohabitation is greater under premier-presidentialism than president-
parliamentarism, again because parties under the latter are more presidentialised 
– the authors provide compelling empirical evidence to back up their theoretical 
claims. 
Generally, the organisation of the book and the execution of the argument 
could serve as a blueprint for the work of any early-career academic. Samuels 
and Shugart have provided a lesson in how to present a piece of research as well 
as making a genuinely innovative contribution to comparative political analysis 
and, in particular, to the study of the effects of executive-legislative relations on 
party development and behaviour. 
 
QUIBBLES, QUESTIONS AND QUERIES 
 
Any large-scale research exercise raises various issues of research design. 
Authors have to make choices and those choices can always be contested. As 
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long as the choices do not make a material difference to the findings of the 
project, then the issues are minor and do not threaten the validity of the overall 
results. This section identifies a number of such issues in Samuels and Shugart’s 
book, but they are all of the ‘relatively minor’ type. None of them challenges the 
fundamental nature of the project. 
 As with any large-n study, the issue of case selection can be questioned. 
As noted previously, the authors rely on the Polity IV dataset to identify the 
universe of democracies from 1945-2007. Recently, the methodology 
underpinning the Polity IV project has been challenged.34 Some of these problems 
manifest themselves when Polity is used as a continuous variable, which is not 
the case in the Samuels and Shugart volume. However, it might be noted that the 
authors neither justify the choice of Polity, nor do they attempt to use any other 
way of identifying democracy as a check of the robustness of their results. 
Recently, the strategy of confirming any results by using more than one measure 
of democracy has been strongly recommended by Bayer and Bernhard.35 In 
addition, Samuels and Shugart use the +5 polity2 score as their threshold for 
democracy. However, even though Bogaards has shown that there is no 
consensus as to where the threshold for democracy should be drawn using 
Polity,36 a score of +6 is perhaps the commonest threshold, not least because this 
is the one that is used by the authors of the Polity project themselves. Moreover, 
even though Samuels and Shugart have clear, if contestable, criteria for 
identifying democracies, they seem to break their own rules by ignoring short 
authoritarian intervals. This point seems to apply to Malawi and Zambia, both of 
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which had a period of ≥+5 democracy followed by two and five years 
respectively of authoritarianism and then a further period of ≥+5 democracy. 
Rather than identifying separate periods of democracy in each country, Samuels 
and Shugart identify only one longer period. Again, the results are unlikely to be 
affected by such a decision, but it is a somewhat strange choice.37 Generally, the 
authors identify a set of countries that look like democracies and quack like 
democracies. So, they probably are democracies. However, the choice of Polity 
and the +5 threshold need to be justified. What is more, the authors might be a 
little more careful when subsequently they generalise from this set of 
democracies. For example, they state that Austria is “the only obviously 
‘parliamentarized’ president-parliamentary regime in the world today”.38 Well, 
Iceland is certainly a candidate for inclusion in such a list, but it is excluded from 
the Polity dataset because it has a population of fewer than 500,000 people. So, 
the general statement is perhaps a little misleading. Equally, Samuels and 
Shugart state that “no premier-presidential democracy has ever been replaced by 
an authoritarian regime”.39 They do acknowledge that this statement is driven by 
their case selection, but even so it is perhaps too bold a statement as citizens of 
Congo-Brazzaville in 1992, Niger in 1996, and Haiti in 1999 might wish to 
testify.40 
 Another aspect of research design in a study of this sort with which it is 
always possible to quibble is the classification of certain countries as examples of 
particular regime types. In this regard, the classification of Madagascar is 
genuinely puzzling. Here, it is classed as premier-presidential from 1991-1993, 
president-parliamentary from 1993-1997 and presidential from 1997-2007. 
However, in October 1991 an interim constitution was passed that provided little 
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detail about the nature of executive-legislative relations.41 The first democratic 
constitution was promulgated in August 1992 and was premier-presidential.42 In 
October 1995 the constitution was changed and Madagascar became president-
parliamentary.43 The text was then amended again in April 1998, but no material 
change was made in terms of its provisions for censuring the government.44 Thus, 
the classification of Madagascar is serially contestable. A different issue 
altogether is raised when it comes to the classification of Austria and Ireland. 
Constitutionally, both countries are semi-presidential, but politically both 
operate as de facto parliamentary regimes. The authors are well aware of the 
exceptional nature of both countries,45 but they appear to make different 
operational decisions in each case. The Austrian case is discussed in some detail46 
and the decision is taken to exclude Austria from the list of president-
parliamentary cases for the purposes of the quantitative analysis. This is a 
perfectly reasonable decision and a clear justification is provided for it. However, 
Ireland seems to be systematically included in the list of premier-presidential 
cases for such purposes. In isolation, each decision is perfectly justifiable, but 
given both countries are exceptional and for essentially the same reason it seems 
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a little strange not to treat them in the same way. Given there are a large number 
of Ireland years in the dataset,47 it would be interesting to explicitly report the 
difference it would make if Ireland were excluded from the list of premier-
presidential cases or if both Austria and Ireland were operationalised as 
parliamentary regimes. 
 A great strength of the book is the way it undertakes a comprehensive set 
of empirical tests of the central theoretical proposition. That said, one or two of 
the tests are less fulfilling than they might at first appear and/or than they might 
otherwise have been. This is particularly the case with the chapter on the 
electoral separation of purpose. As defined above, this concept “measures the 
degree to which the electoral process generates misalignment of the political 
incentives between a party’s executive candidate and its median legislative 
candidate”.48 The expectation is that the intraparty dilemmas caused by separate 
origin and survival of the executive will generate the situation where this 
misalignment is relatively large. By contrast, there can be no electoral separation 
of purpose under parliamentarism, “because there is no way for a citizen to vote 
for a party’s prime ministerial candidate without also endorsing the party’s 
legislative candidate or slate”.49 This is true. The reason, though, why this test is 
less fulfilling than the others in the book is because, as the authors state, by 
definition there can be no electoral separation of purpose under parliamentarism. 
Thus, Samuels and Shugart have created a test that can only be falsified if they 
were to find no evidence of electoral separation of purpose under 
presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. They authors do find such evidence. 
Therefore, the proposition is true. This is a perfectly reasonable research strategy 
and the test for evidence of electoral separation of purpose under these two 
regimes is very sophisticated. All the same, it might have been more fulfilling to 
have devised a test that could, by definition, have generated some variation 
within the set of parliamentary countries and that, therefore, would have 
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allowed a comparison of the full set of countries in the dataset. The concept of 
the electoral separation of purpose cannot be operationalised in this way. 
Perhaps, though, another test might have been devised. For example, in the UK 
during the Blair premiership there were concerns within the ruling Labour Party 
that the Prime Minister (PM) was leading the party away from some of its core 
values. This was being done, Blair’s supporters claimed, in order to maximise the 
party’s chances of being re-elected. As a result, though, on certain issues there 
were backbench rebellions against the PM’s policies.50 Such rebellions are not a 
manifestation of an electoral separation of purpose, but they may be an example 
of intraparty tensions caused by the executive candidate (the PM) being 
concerned with vote maximisation and the parliamentary party (or elements of 
it) being concerned with policy maximisation. This is very close to the dilemma 
that Samuels and Shugart are trying to capture in the electoral separation of 
purpose. If cross-national levels of governing party cohesion had been measured, 
then parliamentary countries could have been included fully in the test. 
 The same sense of a certain lack of fulfillment applies to the situation 
where Samuels and Shugart are unable to test for the effect of variation within 
semi-presidentialism. This occurs in the chapter on the electoral separation of 
purpose and also in the chapter on policy switching. The reason why all semi-
presidential countries have to be lumped together in these chapters is because 
the country numbers are too small for the two types of semi-presidentialism to 
be operationalised separately. Again, in both chapters the empirical tests are 
carefully designed and implemented. Moreover, the results are entirely 
consistent with the expectations of the theoretical claims. So, there is no 
fundamental problem in this regard with the findings in either of the chapters. 
That said, there is always a nagging concern about any results when semi-
presidential countries are clustered together. Semi-presidentialism in Ireland is 
very different from semi-presidentialism in Peru. What is more, the low number 
of semi-presidential countries is, of course, a function of the case-selection 
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procedure. It would have been possible to increase the semi-presidential n and 
perhaps allow for the two types of semi-presidentialism to be tested separately 
had a different case selection procedure been applied. This could have been 
achieved by lowering the Polity threshold for democracy or by using the 
Freedom House and/or the Polyarchy datasets as either the main data source for 
the book or as an alternative data source for the hypotheses in these chapters and 
perhaps also as a robustness check for the hypotheses in other chapters. In 
fairness to Samuels and Shugart, though, life is short and data collection is 
potentially never-ending. The decision to use Polity IV as the data source and +5 
as the democracy threshold does need to be justified, but both are justifiable 
choices. Whether or not the results change on the basis of a different data source 
and/or whether there is evidence of the effects of variation within semi-
presidentialism as a function of using such a source are projects for another day 
or for other researchers. 
 Finally, the book generates a disparate set of minor queries and 
comments. For example, how do the authors operationalise non-partisanship? In 
presidential and president-parliamentary regimes especially, presidents have 
been known to stand as independent candidates. Sometimes such non-
partisanship is merely a front for a candidate who is clearly partisan. Other times 
the candidate may be genuinely non-partisan at the election but afterwards may 
receive the support of a party or bloc of parties in the legislature, thus, in effect, 
becoming partisan. It is not entirely clear how Samuels and Shugart treated any 
cases of non-partisanship and whether this issue has the potential to make any 
difference to their results. In addition, the very brief discussion towards the end 
of the book about the relationship between regime type and democratic survival 
is perhaps a little out of place given the focus of the volume as a whole.51 
Moreover, the failure to mention any control variables in this discussion means 
that the comments are even more speculative than they are presented. Lastly, the 
country expert in me is compelled to point out one mistake and one highly 
contestable statement in the case study of France. Samuels and Shugart state that 
Mitterrand joined the Socialist party (PS) “after he had announced his 
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presidential candidacy in 1974” (emphasis in the original).52 They cite a chapter 
by Ben Clift when making this point, but they misinterpret his text. As Clift is 
very well aware, Mitterrand joined the PS in 1971. Also, they state that “by 2002 
nearly all parties had become presidentialized” in that each “saw advantage to 
presenting a presidential candidate”.53 At the 1981 presidential election all of the 
electorally competitive parties stood candidates and Jean-Marie Le Pen, whose 
National Front party was not competitive at that time, also tried to stand but 
failed gain the requisite number of signatures. So, 2002 is a very late date for the 
presidentialisation of parties in France, even on the basis of the authors’ specific 
criterion in this regard. 
 Overall, these points are not meant to cast doubt on the overall research 
design of the project or the empirical findings. It is rare to find authors being so 
transparent about their choice of research design, their definitions of key 
concepts, and their classifications of particular countries. Too often, issues of 
such fundamental theoretical and empirical importance are buried away or taken 
for granted. This is not the case here. As a result, though, Samuels and Shugart 
actually make it easier for the reviewer to quibble with certain choices. 
Hopefully, such behaviour by the reviewer can be forgiven. 
 
SETTING A RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
As befits a major research volume, Samuels and Shugart end their study by 
identifying various ways in which the research agenda could be taken forward.54 
For example, they urge variation in the separation of powers to be placed more 
centrally in explanations of party-system emergence and consolidation. They ask 
whether such variation may affect parties’ organisational evolution and whether 
this might explain why there are so few shifts from presidentialism to 
parliamentarism. They raise the issue of how the separation of powers affects 
election campaigns, coalitional strategies, campaign organisation, and the 
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allocation of resources. They also encourage scholars to explore presidential 
influence in representation more fully, notably whether voters hold presidents 
personally accountable. 
 In the rest of this article, I would like to provide a brief demonstration of 
how Samuels and Shugart’s work has the potential to set the agenda in other 
areas too. To do so, I will focus on one of their findings about cohabitation under 
semi-presidentialism. Their theoretical framework leads them to hypothesise that 
cohabitation is likely to be more frequent under premier-presidentialism than 
under president-parliamentarism. Indeed, they state that they “expect 
cohabitation to almost never occur under president-parliamentarism”.55 The 
empirical evidence confirms this expectation. They found only one case of 
cohabitation under president-parliamentarism, namely in Sri Lanka from 2001-
2004.56 In my work on semi-presidentialism I have frequently been struck by the 
commonplace argument that cohabitation is dangerous for the survival of new 
democracies – because it creates conflict within the executive between the 
president and prime minister – and yet the lack of evidence to support such an 
argument – only Niger has collapsed during a period of cohabitation.57 Even 
though Samuels and Shugart do not address the issue of democratic survival 
systematically, their theoretical framework helps to explain why there is so little 
evidence to support the argument about the perils of cohabitation. 
 To demonstrate this point, I also rely on the Polity IV dataset. I identify all 
countries with semi-presidential constitutions since the first cases in Finland and 
Weimar Germany in 1919 through to 2008 inclusive. I consider a country to be 
democratic when it has a polity2 score of ≥+1. Thus, a country’s democracy 
collapses if it first receives a score of ≥+1 and then at some later stage it receives a 
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score of ≤0. Using the same definition of semi-presidentialism as Samuels and 
Shugart and the same definition of cohabitation, I find that there were 740 
country years of semi-presidential democracy from 1919-2008 inclusive during 
which time there were 100 years of cohabitation. However, I also find that 87 of 
the 100 cohabitation observations occurred in countries with a Polity IV score of 
+9 or +10. Bearing in mind that the highest score recorded by a semi-presidential 
democracy in the year prior to its collapse was +8, which occurred both in 
Austria in 1932 before it collapsed in 1933 and in Niger in 1995 before it collapsed 
in 1996, what this shows is that cohabitation has overwhelmingly occurred in 
countries that are, in effect, consolidated democracies, where democracy is the 
only game in town and where it is extremely unlikely that a collapse will ever 
occur. Thus, critics of semi-presidentialism who believe that cohabitation is 
dangerous for the survival of democracy have made this argument on the basis 
of a faulty assumption. They have assumed that the incidence of cohabitation 
will be distributed evenly across the range of semi-presidential democracies and 
that when it occurs in young or fragile democracies the political system may not 
be able to survive their impact. In fact, though, the figures demonstrate that the 
distribution of this potentially problematic situation is heavily skewed towards 
the set of democratically consolidated countries. Therefore, cohabitation is 
unlikely to be generally problematic for the survival of young democracies. Why, 
though, is the distribution of cohabitation and a divided executive skewed 
towards consolidated democracies? Samuels and Shugart’s framework provides 
the answer. Using the Polity ≥+1 threshold for democracy, I find that only 13 of 
the 100 cohabitation observations occurred in countries with a president-
parliamentary form of semi-presidentialism. What is more, eight of these 13 
observations occurred in Austria, which, everyone agrees, is a highly anomalous 
case. Thus, Samuels and Shugart’s empirical intuition is confirmed even when a 
different threshold of Polity IV democracy is used and on the basis of a longer 
time period. Cohabitation is much more likely to occur under premier-
presidentialism than under president-parliamentarism. 
Together, the findings that cohabitation overwhelmingly occurs in 
consolidated democracies and in premier-presidential democracies are 
suggestive. They indicate that the critics of semi-presidentialism are undoubtedly 
correct to point out that countries with this type of constitution are likely to 
experience cohabitation. However, the critics miss the fact that cohabitation is 
least likely to occur in the countries that are most likely to collapse. This does not 
mean that semi-presidentialism is a good choice for young democracies. It 
simply means that when semi-presidential democracies collapse they are more 
likely to do so for reasons other than the standard problems of cohabitation. 
Whether a country has a president-parliamentary constitution or a premier-
presidential constitution is likely to be one such reason. As Samuels and Shugart 
imply, under president-parliamentarism with presidentialised parties presidents 
have an incentive to govern against the legislature, including, if need be, 
representatives of their own party. Rather than cohabit, they are likely to try to 
form minority governments and/or to rule by decree. This is the real threat to 
young democracies. By contrast, under premier-presidentialism the president 
can govern only through the legislature and the government that it approves. 
This may mean that presidents have to experience cohabitation from time to 
time. Generally, though, it also means that they are more likely to try to reach 
wide-ranging political deals with parties in the legislature so as to maximise their 
influence over the legislative process. The inclusiveness of premier-
presidentialism relative to president-parliamentarism is the reason why 
countries with this form of semi-presidentialism are less likely to collapse than 
those with a president-parliamentary form. A controlled statistical test of this 
argument carried out with Petra Schleiter confirms this finding and also that 
cohabitation is a poor predictor of why some semi-presidential democracies 
collapse and others survive.58 It also shows that the intuitions at the heart of the 
Samuels and Shugart volume can be applied very widely. 
 
CONCLUSION 
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Samuels and Shugart have rebooted a particular research agenda in comparative 
politics. In fact, they have done so in perhaps two regards. Most clearly, they 
have demonstrated that party behaviour and organisation are in large part a 
function of variation in the separation of powers. This finding provides a direct 
challenge to those who argue that party organisation is primarily the result of 
sociological cleavages or state organisation. Instead, Samuels and Shugart show 
that regime type is the ‘missing variable’ when explaining variation in party 
organisation. In addition, though, their work also suggests that party 
organisation might be the ‘missing variable’ in studies of the effect of regime 
types. They argue that party organisation mimics constitutional structure – 
presidentialised parties are the result of presidentialised constitutional systems. 
If this is the case, then parties also need to be integrated into studies of the effects 
of political regimes. Such studies need to pay attention to the direct effects of 
regime types on political outcomes, but Samuels and Shugart’s work indicates 
that such studies also need to pay attention to the concomitant effects of party 
organisation on such outcomes. Indeed, arguably, this aspect of their study is the 
one with the greater potential to shape the broader research agenda. The study of 
why political parties have different organisational features is long-standing and 
ongoing, but it is relatively narrow. To put the point another way, there is a 
debate over whether there has been a shift to cartel parties. That debate, for those 
who follow it, is vibrant, but it has had little generalisable impact on the 
comparative politics research agenda. Samuels and Shugart have added to that 
debate. By contrast, the study of the effect of regime types has an extremely 
broad application in comparative politics, international political economy, 
political history and so on. If Samuels and Shugart have successfully 
demonstrated that the study of regime types needs to incorporate the study of 
political parties and their organisational features as well, then the impact of this 
book is likely to be even greater still. 
